The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms by Goodman, Laurie S. & Shaffer, Sherrill
Commentary & Debate
The Economics of Deposit Insurance: A
Critical Evaluation of Proposed Reforms
Laurie S. Goodmant
Sherrill Shaffert
In The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services
Industry,1 Chairman William M. Isaac of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) suggests that major reform of the federal depository
insurance system is necessary to assure sound banking practices in a pe-
riod of widespread deregulation of financial markets.2 Isaac identifies
three recent changes in the financial services industry which have created
a need to re-evaluate the role of deposit insurance: expansion of the prod-
uct lines which banks are allowed to offer, partial removal of constraints
on interstate banking, and gradual elimination of interest rate ceilings on
bank deposits.' We agree with Isaac that these changes present a serious
challenge to the present system of financial services regulation;" we disa-
gree, however, with his proposed reforms.
Isaac suggests three major reforms of the present system to respond to
the additional risks posed by deregulation: (1) risk-adjusted deposit insur-
ance premiums, (2) a systematic policy of partial nonpayment of unin-
sured deposits and (3) additional financial disclosure.5 Ostensibly, risk-
adjusted premiums would discourage banks from knowingly undertaking
activity marked by excessive risk, because a higher premium would in-
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1. Isaac, The Role of Deposit Insurance in the Emerging Financial Services Industry, I YALE J. ON
REG. 195 (1984).
2. Id. at 206-13.
3. Id. at 198, 204-06.
4. Banking operations may indeed be exposed to additional sources of risk if they are permitted to
expand into new product lines without additional supervision. Geographic deregulation could further
increase competitive pressure within the industry, temporarily raising the risk of bank failures as
inefficient firms are exposed. Finally, the removal of interest rate ceilings on bank deposits may in-
crease a bank's operating costs, posing an additional threat to bank earnings.
5. Id. at 207-11.
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crease the marginal cost of such risk-taking." Partial non-payment of un-
insured deposits and additional disclosure are intended to strengthen mar-
ket discipline of bank risk-taking by making the cost of borrowed funds a
function of risk.7
This Comment argues that the three reforms advocated by Isaac are
neither necessary nor desirable. Indeed, implementing all three reforms
simultaneously could seriously destabilize financial markets. Section I
presents a brief overview of the present system of deposit insurance, em-
phasizing its relationship to other safety mechanisms in the financial regu-
latory structure which may mitigate the need for extensive reform of the
deposit insurance system. Section II argues that Isaac's fundamental pre-
mise-that deregulation will permanently increase the riskiness of insured
institutions-may be wrong and that, on the contrary, deregulation even-
tually may reduce the risk of failure. Section III discusses particular
problems posed by the FDIC's suggested reforms, including the problems
raised by likely market responses. Finally, Section IV examines several
alternatives to the FDIC's proposals.
I. An Overview of the Present System
The major justification for a deposit insurance system operated by the
federal government$ rests on macroeconomic grounds:9 Deposit insurance
acts as a stabilizer by preventing bank runs and the dangerous reduction
in the nation's money supply that large-scale bank failures can cause. 0 In
6. Id. at 207-08.
7. Id. at 208-11.
8. Federal deposit insurance was introduced in the United States with the enactment of the Bank-
ing Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (current version codified in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C. (1982)). The statutes which currently regulate FDIC operations are codified at 12 U.S.C. §§
1811-1832 (1982).
The FDIC only insures deposit accounts in commercial and mutual savings banks. The deposit
insurance system was extended to include deposits in savings and loan associations in the National
Housing Act of 1934, ch. 847, tit. IV, 48 Stat. 1246, 1255 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1724(1982)), which created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. In 1970 Congress en-
acted legislation directing the National Credit Union Administration to insure accounts in credit un-
ions. Act of Oct. 14, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, 84 Stat. 994 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1781-
1790 (1982)).
For a brief discussion of the history and current status of federal deposit insurance, see Isaac, supra
note 1, at 196-200.
9. Preserving the stability of financial institutions is usually cited as the primary goal of the fed-
eral deposit insurance system. See, e.g., Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking: Some Pro-
posals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858-59 (1971).
However, deposit insurance has also been justified on microeconomic grounds. Because of the high
information costs of investigating the strength of a financial institution and evaluating the quality of
an institution's management, small depositors generally do not learn of a bank's precarious financial
condition until payment has been suspended, when it is too late to act upon the information. The
critical role of bank deposits in the U.S. financial system necessitates the protection which deposit
insurance affords small depositors. See Isaac, supra note 1, at 200-02.
10. L. CHANDLER & S. GOLDFELD, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING 197-98 (7th ed.
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the absence of insurance, the failure of a bank or series of banks reduces
deposits, which in turn reduces the money supply. In addition, depositors
at other institutions may attempt to withdraw their money before those
institutions also fail, thereby creating bank runs." By guaranteeing to re-
place deposits lost as a result of a bank failure, deposit insurance forestalls
bank runs and thereby stabilizes the money supply at the pre-failure level.
In addition to deposit insurance, two other mechanisms, the discount
window" and the supervision and examination process,"3 help safeguard
the banking industry from destabilizing influences. These three mecha-
nisms form a comprehensive safety net which maintains the soundness of
the financial services industry. The existence of the two additional safety
mechanisms is often overlooked and greatly complicates deposit insurance
reform; any alteration in the effective protection afforded by one mecha-
nism must take into account the impact of such a change on the protection
afforded by the others.
Each safety mechanism plays a different role in protecting banks from
failure. The importance of each mechanism varies, depending on the se-
verity of the financial troubles confronting the institution. The role of the
supervision and examination process is to establish norms for sound bank-
ing practices, to detect banks which are showing signs of weakness, to
highlight those weaknesses to bank management, and to encourage or re-
quire corrective action. 4 The other two safety mechanisms assume greater
importance when a bank experiences more serious financial difficulties.
FDIC insurance protects against the loss of small depositor confidence
while a troubled institution undergoes rehabilitation. The discount win-
dow lends funds to an institution which has become illiquid, thereby
1977). Economists disagree on whether changes in the money supply are the most important factor
determining the level of economic activity, but few question that changes in the money supply are an
important determinant of the level of economic activity. It has been argued that the severity of the
Great Depression resulted primarily from the sharp reduction in the money stock caused by bank
failures and the refusal of the Federal Reserve System to supply reserves to offset currency drains. See
M. FRIEDMAN & A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1867-1960, at 299-
419 (1963).
11. L. RITTER & W. SILBER, PRINCIPLES OF MONEY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 104
(3d ed. 1980).
12. The discount window refers to the process by which a member bank, when short of reserves,
can borrow short-term funds from the Federal Reserve System. The interest rate which the bank must
pay on the borrowed funds is known as the discount rate, which is set by the Federal Reserve. L.
CHANDLER & S. GOLDFELD, supra note 10, at 250-55. The process is not automatic. The Federal
Reserve does not have to lend funds to each bank which requests them and will often refuse to do so
to discourage banks from habitually using the Federal Reserve as a source of reserves. Id. at 253.
13. Bank examination involves an on-site evaluation by government inspectors of the assets, liabil-
ities and procedures of a bank. The inspectors have almost complete access to the bank's records.
Horvitz, A Reconsideration of the Role of Bank Examination, 12 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING
654, 654 (1980). The Federal Reserve and the FDIC share examination and supervision responsibili-
ties. L. CHANDLER & S. GOLDFELD, supra note 10, at 199.
14. See L. CHANDLER & S. GOLDFELD, supra note 10, at 213-14.
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providing regulators with additional time to formulate a solution to the
institution's problem and to avoid possible systemic shocks to financial
markets."
In his specific choice of proposed reforms, Isaac has not addressed the
possibility that one or more of the other safety mechanisms can be used to
respond to the changes caused by deregulation, thereby obviating the need
for drastic changes in the deposit insurance system. The supervision and
examination process provides one such possibility. If the FDIC could con-
duct continuous bank examinations and act on its findings immediately, it
would never suffer a loss because it could simply request the chartering
agency to close a failing bank when the bank's net worth reached zero.
Obviously, the FDIC cannot conduct continuous bank examinations.
However, the FDIC can reduce the possibility that a bank will become
insolvent between examinations by increasing minimum capital standards.
When a bank's earnings decline between examinations, the bank's capital
serves as a buffer against insolvency. As a result, the cost to the FDIC of
disposing of a failed institution is likely to be lower if the bank has a high
capital ratio prior to its difficulties." This fact suggests that the proper
response to deregulation may be strictly enforced minimum capital stan-
dards related to overall bank risk, combined with careful bank supervi-
sion, rather than a major restructuring of deposit insurance.1 7
II. Deregulation and the Need for Reform
As described above, one purpose of deposit insurance is to eliminate
bank runs by removing much of the risk of loss from bank failure which
depositors would otherwise bear. Eliminating this risk, however, necessa-
rily reduces depositors' incentives to discipline banks which engage in ex-
cessive risk-taking. Consequently, Isaac has argued that without a strict
scheme of regulation constraining the activities in which banks may
15. See id. at 255 (discussing how discount window lending to Franklin National Bank in 1974
gave regulators time to reorganize the bank). Discount window lending gives the Federal Reserve a
great deal of leverage in dealing with a troubled bank because it can either roll over its discount
window lendings or refuse to extend additional credit, essentially leaving the chartering agency with
no choice but to declare the bank insolvent. Consequently, at least with respect to large banks, the
Federal Reserve actually makes the key judgments regarding solvency. See Horvitz, Failures of Large
Banks: Implications for Banking Supervision and Deposit Insurance, 10 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS 589, 597 (1975).
16. See Horvitz, supra note 13, at 655-67; Orgler, Capital Adequacy and Recoveries from Failed
Banks, 30 J. FINANCE 1366, 1369-73 (1975).
17. Koehn and Santomero have suggested that minimum capital ratios may actually increase bank
risk because such ratios will induce banks to make riskier loans to compensate for their higher capital
burden. See Koehn and Santomero, Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk, 35 J. FINANCE
1235, 1240-43 (1980). This argument highlights the importance of tying increases in required capital
ratios to bank risk.
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engage, the geographic scope of their operations, and the interest rates
which they may pay, banks will be able to take excessive risks free of
market discipline."8 As a result, he contends that deregulation in any of
these areas will destabilize financial markets unless accompanied by sub-
stantial reform of the deposit insurance system. 9
Although some dangers exist, Isaac takes an unnecessarily pessimistic
view of the risks posed by deregulation. In fact, the removal of product
line limitations, geographic boundaries, and interest rate ceilings will not
inevitably endanger the stability of the financial services industry. Dereg-'
ulation in these areas actually may improve the industry's overall financial
condition. Moreover, as mentioned above, enhancing bank supervision and
examination can greatly reduce losses to the FDIC due to deregulation.
Therefore, at least at present, the possible risks posed by deregulation do
not justify the extensive changes proposed by the FDIC.
A. Product Line Expansion
The products and services which a banking organization may offer have
always been strictly limited. The Depository Institutions Act of 1982,0
for example, prevents banks from engaging in most facets of the insurance
business."1 Similarly, the Glass-Steagall Act2" prevents banking organiza-
tions from underwriting new issues of securities.2 8 Obviously, most bank-
ing organizations would like to expand their powers to underwrite munic-
ipal revenue bonds and perhaps eventually corporate debt. The perception
that underwriting entails unacceptable risks, however, has forestalled reg-
ulatory approval of increased bank participation in such activities. 4
Rather than increasing risk, permitting banks to expand into new prod-
uct lines which are not significantly riskier than normal banking activities
will very likely create an opportunity for beneficial diversification, leading
18. Isaac, supra note 1, at 204-06.
19. Isaac, supra note 1, at 206-07. See also Flannery, Deposit Insurance Creates a Need for Bank
Regulation, Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 17, 20-24 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia); Benston, Deposit Insurance and Bank Failures, ECON. REV., Mar. 1983, at 4, 14-17
(published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
20. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
21. Id. at § 601, 96 Stat. at 1536-38 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)).
22. Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (current version codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
23. Id. at § 16, 48 Stat. at 184-85 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982)). Banking institutions are,
however, permitted to underwrite general obligation municipal bonds.
24. See, e.g., LaFalce, Banking in the Eighties, 37 BUS. LAW. 839, 846-47 (1982). See also 77
CONG. REC. 3835 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL AND FEDERAL RESERVE BANKING SYSTEM, S. REP. NO. 77, 73rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1933) (report on the Senate version of Banking Act of 1933).
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to a lower risk of failure in the long run.2 Although the risk of insolvency
may increase temporarily as banks engage in new activities, those activi-
ties can be isolated in legally separate, nonbank subsidiaries to protect the
banks from additional risk. In addition, as mentioned above, enhanced
bank capitalization and regulatory supervision can help shield banks from
any financial problems their new activities might create.
B. Geographic Expansion
As with product diversification, geographic expansion may ultimately
produce a more robust and shock-resistant financial system. Although
both the McFadden Act26 and the Douglas Amendment to the Bank
Holding Company Act"" effectively prohibit interstate banking,' commer-
cial banks currently provide some financial services across state lines. 2'
These interstate banking activities have not as yet had an adverse effect on
bank risk or profitability; in fact, the significant rate of entry thus far
suggests that these activities provide opportunities to enhance bank
profitability. 80
25. Financial theory argues against the importance of firm level diversification because sharehold-
ers can diversify their portfolios to achieve the desired level of risk. See Schall, Asset Valuation, Firm
Investment, and Finn Diversification, 45 J. BUSINESS 11 (1972) (diversification effects of firm invest-
ments are irrelevant). However, this argument may not apply to banks where the externalities caused
by firm failures create a special need for stability.
26. McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (current version codified in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
27. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (current version codified in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
28. McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (current version codified at 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1982)); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (current
version codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982)).
29. Commercial banking organizations can legally provide services on an interstate basis in four
different ways. First, grandfather provisions in banking legislation permit some banking organizations
to offer interstate financial services. See, e.g., Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, ch. 240, § 3(a), 70
Stat. 133, 134 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982)); International Banking Act of 1978, § 5,
Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607, 613-14 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3103 (1982)). At the end of 1982,
21 domestic banking organizations and seven international banking organizations qualified under
these provisions. Second, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 allows banks and
savings and loan associations to acquire failing banks across state lines. Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act of 1982, § 116, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f) (1982). Third, § 4(c)(6) of the Bank Holding
Company Act authorizes bank holding companies to establish or acquire nonbank subsidiaries that are
not subject to the prohibitions on interstate banking. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(c)(6),
12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). These subsidiaries include mortgage banking companies, finance com-
panies, trust companies, industrial banks, financial advisory companies, and data processing compa-
nies. Finally, a nonbank subsidiary may establish loan production offices and Edge Act corporations, a
practice which effectively permits the parent bank to provide financial services on an interstate basis.
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 611-632 (1982) (Edge Act corporations). For a detailed survey of the extent of bank
forays into interstate banking, see Whitehead, Interstate Banking: Taking Inventory, ECON. REV.,
May 1983, at 4 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta).
30. See Whitehead, supra note 29, at 18 (domestic banking organizations control at least 7383
interstate offices, 1500 of which supply all banking services).
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The Continental Illinois experience"1 provides further support for the
conclusion that geographic deregulation will benefit financial institutions.
Many observers have attributed the problems of Continental Illinois in
part to its reliance on foreign deposits, a practice necessitated by the fact
that Illinois banking laws 2 effectively prohibit the development of an ex-
tensive intrastate retail deposit base."3
C. Elimination of Interest Rate Ceilings
Like product diversification and geographic expansion, the elimination
of interest rate ceilings should not increase the risk of bank failure. Inter-
est rate ceilings, often referred to as Regulation Q ceilings," ' have histori-
cally limited the interest rate on certain types of deposit funds."' They
were designed to avoid situations in which a bank would be forced to
31. In May 1984, the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, the nation's
ninth largest bank, suffered a serious liquidity crisis after rumors of its impending failure triggered a
run on the bank's deposits. Before the run stopped, depositors had removed a large portion of the
bank's funds; estimates of the extent of the outflow range from 89 billion to nearly $20 billion.
The rumors followed a first quarter report of weak earnings, largely attributable to a $140 million
forced write-off of bad loans and a $50 million drop in net interest income. During a period of rapid
growth in the 1970's, Continental compiled a loan portfolio comprised largely of low interest loans to
high risk clients. In addition, the bank acquired more than $1 billion in risky energy loans from the
Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma, which failed in July 1982.
The failure of a bank the size of Continental would have precipitated an unprecedented wave of
bank failures and could have undermined the stability of financial markets worldwide. The U.S.
government therefore was forced to step in with the largest emergency aid package ever assembled for
a financial institution to halt the run and calm the financial markets. To rescue Continental, the
FDIC committed $4.5 billion from its $16.5 billion insurance fund. The Federal Reserve agreed to
lend the failing bank an additional $3.6 billion, and 28 private banks arranged a $5.5 billion line of
credit.
After an unsuccessful attempt to find a bank that would merge with Continental, the FDIC in July
1984 announced that it would purchase $3 billion to $4 billion worth of problem loans from the bank,
paying Continental approximately 50% of their face value. As a consequence, the U.S. Government
now effectively owns 80% of the shareholder equity in Continental. See Thurow, America's Banks in
Crisis, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 48, 72-73; The Continental Scare,
NEWSWEEK, May 28, 1984, at 52; The Continental Bailout, NEWSWEEK, July 30, 1984, at 86.
32. Illinois law effectively prohibits banks from having more than one office. Illinois Banking Act
§ 6, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 313 (Smith-Hurd 1981).
33. As a result of the state's restrictive branch banking laws, large Illinois banks have been unable
to maintain a stable base of domestic consumer deposits and have thus been forced to rely on foreign
investment, through large uninsured certificates of deposits, as an important source of short-term
funds. Continental's large loan losses forced the bank to increase substantially its dependence on over-
seas deposits. These-European and Japanese depositors were the first to pull their funds out of the
bank when rumors of Continental's impending insolvency surfaced. See The Continental Scare,
NEWSWEEK, May 28, 1984, at 52, 54-55.
34. Congress in 1933 prohibited the payment of interest on demand deposits and authorized the
Federal Reserve to set maximum rates payable on time and savings deposits (Regulation Q). Banking
Act of 1933, ch. 89, § lib, 48 Stat. 162, 181-82 (current version codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 371a-371b
(1982)).
35. The Regulation Q restrictions on the interest rates payable on deposits currently are being
phased out pursuant to §§ 201-210 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132, 142-45 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3509
(1982)).
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acquire risky assets that paid high interest rates to cover the high interest
costs of the bank's deposits. 6 Banks have competed away part of this in-
terest cost ceiling, however, by offering implicit interest in the form of free
check clearing and deposit services.3 7 They also have tried to compete by
opening additional branches at convenient locations for depositors.88 The
implicit interest paid nationwide by savings and loan associations, through
free services and convenience banking, has been estimated at fifty percent
of the difference between market rates and Regulation Q ceilings. 9
Furthermore, interest rate ceilings have had a substantial adverse effect
on the ability of banks to attract funds. Whenever market interest rates
rise above Regulation Q ceilings, bank deposits fall sharply. For example,
as interest rates climbed in the late 1970's, money market mutual funds,
which had no interest rate limitations, grew from $43 billion at the end of
1979 to $242 billion in November 1982.40 If banks had been free to pay
market interest rates, a large percentage of this money probably would
have been deposited in banks. Indeed, since December 1982, when banks
were first permitted to offer money market deposit accounts yielding
market-related interest rates, these accounts have grown to nearly $400
billion.4 Deposits in money market mutual funds have fallen by more
than $60 billion during this period.4" If the removal of Regulation Q ceil-
ings elicited substantial additional deposits, bank profitability might actu-
ally increase. Moreover, banks would no longer have the same incentive to
pay implicit interest in the form of customer services. Interest rate deregu-
lation thus should not adversely affect bank profitability and risk.48
36. See S. REP. No. 1601, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2994, 2995 (discussing purposes of Banking Act of 1933) (report on revisions to Regulation Q).
37. See Flannery, Removing Deposit Rate Ceilings:. How Will Bank Profits Fare?, BUS. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 13, 15 (published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia) (estimating that
implicit interest payments to depositors in 1981 amounted to 4.52% of deposit balances).
38. See W. Petersen, Effects of Interest Rate Ceilings on the Number of Banking Offices in the
United States, table 2 (1981) (Fed. Reserve Bank of New York mimeo) (estimating that nearly one
third of all banking offices in 1980 would not have existed without binding Regulation Q ceilings)
(paper on file with the Yale Journal on Regulation); Chase, Interest Rate Deregulation, Branching,
and Competition in the Savings and Loan Industry, 14 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 2 (1981)
(estimating that 66.0% of all savings and loan association branch offices in California would not have
existed without Regulation Q ceilings); Taggart, Effects of Deposit Rate Ceilings: The Evidence from
Massachusetts Savings Banks, 10 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 139, 153 (1978) (estimating that
25.4% of all mutual savings bank branches opened in Massachusetts between 1970 and 1975 were
established to compete for deposits within the restrictions imposed by Regulation Q).
39. See Spellman, Deposit Ceilings and the Efficiency of Financial Intermediation, 35 J. FINANCE
129, 134 (1980). See also Taggart, supra note 38, at 153 (estimating that Massachusetts mutual
savings banks paid implicit interest to their depositors in an amount equal to nearly 40% of the
difference between the regulated deposit rates and unregulated market rates).
40. FED. RESERVE BULL., Sept. 1984, at AI5; FED. RESERVE BULL., Mar. 1983, at A14.
41. FED. RESERVE BULL., July 1984, at A13.
42. Id.
43. See Flannery, supra note 37, at 13 (stock market data and accounting data on bank profitabil-
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In summary, it is by no means certain that deregulation will increase
the risk of bank failure. Rather, deregulation may eventually create a
stronger and more robust banking industry. Major changes in the deposit
insurance program thus seem unwarranted, particularly since existing ex-
amination and supervisory processes can be strengthened to reduce the
likelihood that deregulation will impose substantial losses on the FDIC.
Furthermore, as discussed in the following part, the proposed reforms
might themselves have adverse effects on financial stability.
III. An Evaluation of the FDIC's Proposed Reforms
Economists agree that policies which fail to anticipate the reactions of
the market to regulatory changes may create a misallocation of resources.
Recent theoretical work, however, has established that such myopia also
may lead to erratic and seemingly unpredictable dynamic behavior, tech-
nically termed "chaos.""" This possibility suggests that regulators nor-
mally should adopt a cautious stance, favoring the status quo over changes
which might produce unpredictable consequences. The reforms proposed
by Isaac are comprehensive and may lead to unstable behavior by various
market participants. They therefore should be evaluated with this poten-
tial for instability in mind. This section examines the possible effects of
each of Isaac's proposals.
A. Risk-Adjusted Premiums
Isaac's first proposal is a system of risk-adjusted deposit insurance pre-
miums. Isaac's proposal, however, falls short of achieving its aims and
would be destablizing. Isaac correctly observes that deposit insurance in-
sulates commercial banks from full market discipline over risk-taking.""
He also correctly argues that a properly constructed risk-based premium
schedule would increase the cost to banks of risk-taking activity. Disci-
pline over excessive risk-taking could be increased in two ways, depending
upon how the premiums were implemented: (1) the variable premium
rate would create a direct incentive for banks to limit their risk-taking
activities and (2) public disclosure of the premium paid by a bank would
trigger additional market discipline based upon the information in the dis-
closure. To be effective, however, a risk-based premium system must em-
ity suggest that, over the long term, most banks should find their profits largely unaffected by deposit
rate regulation).
44. See Artstein, Irregular Cobweb Dynamics, 13 ECON. LET'TERS 15 (1983); Shaffer, Chaos,
Naivete, and Consistent Conjectures, 14 ECON. LETTERS 155 (1984); T. POSTON & I. STEWART,
CATASTROPHE THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 426 (1978).
45. Isaac, supra note 1, at 207.
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ploy accurate measures of the riskiness of a bank's activities and impose
premiums with significant risk differentials. Small risk differentials will
not affect the amount of risk a bank will assume. Moreover, premiums
based on inaccurate risk determinations may alter bank behavior in per-
verse and unpredictable ways.
The risk-based premium schedule which Isaac has proposed is seriously
flawed because the contemplated differential is far too small to have any
discernible impact on the amount of risk assumed by a bank."" In addi-
tion, as Isaac candidly admits, the information and expertise necessary to
set precise and reliable risk-adjusted premiums with meaningful risk dif-
ferentials do not currently exist. 47 As a consequence, Isaac's proposed sys-
tem will not produce the desired results.
Even if the FDIC could set risk-adjusted premiums accurately, the use
of such premiums to control bank risk-taking is unnecessary to ensure the
soundness of the insurance system. As mentioned earlier, no failure need
ever impose a significant cost on the insurance fund as long as it is
promptly detected and the insuring agency acts swiftly.'8 Rather than de-
signing risk-adjusted premiums, then, regulators should try to improve
their ability to recognize and react promptly to bank financial
difficulties. 9
In addition to being unnecessary, even an ideal risk-based premium sys-
tem may be counterproductive. Because a risk-based system would force
banks to pay higher premiums only when they encountered difficulty and
consequently became more risky, such a system probably would exacer-
bate the risk of bank failure. Furthermore, if premium differentials were
large enough to influence bank behavior, they might have a perverse
macroeconomic effect. Levels of credit risk typically are higher during
downturns in the business cycle. Under a system of risk-adjusted premi-
ums, this higher risk would cause insurance premiums to rise as the busi-
ness cycle turned downward, hence discouraging banks from lending
46. The FDIC's current proposal would only adjust the partial refund of insurance assessments
collected during the year by the FDIC in excess of operating and insurance expenses. See Isaac, supra
note 1, at 207-08. Given historical levels of the rebate, such an adjustment would amount to a mere
four or five basis points. (A basis point equals one one-hundredth of a percentage point.) When one
considers that the normal spread on bank intermediation operations exceeds 100 basis points, it is
evident that the direct impact of the adjustment on bank decision-making would be negligible.
47. Isaac, supra note 1, at 207 ("Under an 'ideal' system, the insurance fund would be fully
compensated for all risk-taking. Such a system would, however, entail unrealistic data requirements
and require risk quantification techniques not currently available.").
48. See Horvitz, supra note 13, at 658; G. BIERWAG & G. KAUFMAN, A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE WITH RISK SENSITIVE PREMIUMS 45 (1983) (published by the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago).
49. Some steps toward improving regulatory response, such as continuous monitoring of banks by
computer, have already been suggested. See Conte, Regulators Say Banking Safeguards Are Faulty
and Need an Overhaul, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1983, at 23, col. 4.
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money precisely when macroeconomic policy would dictate an increase in
the money supply. Similarly, the lower average premiums which would
accompany upswings in the economy would exacerbate the usual easing of
credit, fueling overexpansion of the economy. 50
B. Partial Nonpayment of Uninsured Deposits
As the second feature of his deposit insurance reform package, Isaac has
proposed that the FDIC adopt a systematic policy of partial nonpayment
of uninsured deposits.5 1 Under such a policy, depositors with accounts ex-
ceeding $100,000 would not be fully protected in the event of bank fail-
ure. 52 By placing depositors somewhat at risk, the FDIC would induce
those depositors to evaluate the risk levels of competing banks. As a result,
risky institutions would be forced either to offer a higher interest rate to
compensate for the higher probability of loss or to reduce their levels of
risk. By increasing the market discipline imposed by depositors, a partial
nonpayment policy would constrain risk-taking by financial institutions.
Although intuitively appealing, partial nonpayment of uninsured depos-
its presents several problems. Most seriously, the threat of partial nonpay-
ment would undermine the primary objective of deposit insurance: to
avoid the destabilizing effects of bank runs. In addition, the initial destabi-
lizing effects of such a program would induce many depositors to transfer
funds from their banks to insured accounts or low-risk securities. Finally,
the use of brokered CDs might thwart the policy altogether.
1. Encouraging Bank Runs
A partial nonpayment policy would encourage bank runs by giving de-
positors a strong incentive to withdraw their funds from a bank at the first
rumor of trouble. Such withdrawals would contribute to the financial in-
stability of the bank, causing even more depositors to make withdrawals.
50. See L. GOODMAN & A. SANTOMERO, VARIABLE RATE DEPOSIT INSURANCE: A RE-EXAMINA.
TION 2, 20 Uuly 1984) (fixed rate deposit insurance has important beneficial consequences for
macroeconomic stabilization which are not shared by a variable rate scheme) (paper on file with the
Yale Journal on Regulation).
51. Isaac, supra note 1, at 209-11.
52. Under the current system, all deposits up to $100,000 are de jure insured. See 12 U.S.C. §
1821(a)(1) (1982). Until recently, deposits greater than $100,000 were perceived to be de facto in-
sured as a result of the FDIC policy of disposing of failed banks through purchase and assumption
transactions rather than deposit payouts. As long as the failed bank was merged into another institu-
tion, uninsured depositors suffered no loss. For a discussion of the development of the purchase and
assumption transaction, see Isaac, supra note 1, at 202-03.
The FDIC broke the illusion that all deposits, regardless of size, were fully insured when it dis-
posed of the failed Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma through a deposit payout rather than a merger in
1982. Thurow, supra note 31, at 73. Penn Square was the only bank with assets exceeding $100
million to receive this treatment. Id.
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Once an outright run began, all uninsured depositors would be compelled
to participate because no one would want to risk being unable to with-
draw at all. Moreover, many insured depositors might choose to flee
rather than await the resolution of the crisis. Because most short term
depositors can withdraw quickly, 58 a partial nonpayment scheme could
quickly compromise the stability of the financial system.54
The present complex relationships among major banks suggests that a
policy of partial nonpayment could contribute not only to the failure of a
troubled bank, but also could harm those institutions with which the
troubled bank had close relationships. The experience of Continental
Illinois is instructive. Immediately after large depositors started withdraw-
ing funds from Continental, depositors began to scrutinize other institu-
tions more closely, creating temporary funding problems for a number of
the largest banks. 55 The crisis abated only when the FDIC and the Fed-
eral Reserve intervened. 56 Major banks recognized the risk of disaster
and, in an effort to quiet the market, rushed to lend funds to
Continental. 7
Thus the highly interwoven character of the present financial system,
with lines of credit extended between banks and loan participations shared
by many banks, ensures that the effect of a run could not be confined to
one or even a few banks.'8 In the event of a run, the discount window
might have to provide a minimally adequate level of liquidity to a major
segment of the financial community.
53. Unlike longer term depositors holding CDs, short-term depositors do not forfeit interest pay-
ments or principal if they withdraw their funds at any time.
54. The attitudes of uninsured depositors have changed markedly since the Penn Square failure.
They have started to run even more quickly, creating temporary liquidity problems for troubled insti-
tutions. Thurow, supra note 31, at 73. Continental Illinois faced serious liquidity problems in May
1984, less than two days after rumors began to circulate about its unexpectedly high loan losses. The
Continental Scare, NEWSWEEK, May 28, 1984, at 52, 53-54. If the FDIC had had a stated policy of
partial nonpayment of uninsured deposits at that time, it is likely that these depositors would have run
even faster, necessitating more discount window borrowing at an earlier stage.
55. For example, Manufacturer Hanover Trust Co. experienced a small run in the wake of the
Continental crisis. See Thurow, supra note 31, at 73.
A House of Representatives subcommittee has estimated that six banks with $385 million in com-
bined assets would have immediately failed had Continental been declared insolvent. Twenty-two
other banks would have been at serious risk of collapse because their exposure in Continental was
between 50% and 100% of their capital. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1984, at D5, col. 1.
56. See supra note 31.
57. Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. and the Federal Reserve lined up 28 of the nation's largest
banks to provide Continental with a $5.5 billion line of credit for as long a time as the bank needed to
resolve its liquidity problems. See N.Y. Times, May 19, 1984, at Al, col. 6.
58. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1984, at Dl, col. 1 ($279 million in loan losses written off by
First National Bank of Chicago could force six other major banks that participated in the loans to
write them off as well).
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2. Destabilizing Initial Effects
The second problem with partial nonpayment is its initial destabilizing
effect. A partial nonpayment system initially would cause significant shifts
in the relative yields of bank CDs and government securities, as risk-
averse, uninsured depositors moved their funds from financial institutions
into relatively riskless securities such as U.S. Treasury obligations. Even
though some depositors would not switch to government securities, they
might still transfer their funds to less risky banks or perhaps only to the
largest banks. As a consequence, most banks would be forced to pay a
higher interest rate to obtain additional funds; at the same time, they
would lose some of their deposits. This combination could induce troubled
institutions to undertake even more risky loans.59
3. Encouraging Brokered CDs
The final weakness of a partial nonpayment policy is that it would
encourage the brokering of CDs.60 For example, after the 1982 failure of
the Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma and the FDIC's announcement that
it would not fully protect depositors with accounts exceeding $100,000,
brokers began to break large deposits into $100,000 denominations, plac-
ing each in a different bank to ensure full insurance.61
The encouragement of brokered CDs creates two reasons for concern.
First, the use of brokered CDs can effectively circumvent the partial non-
payment policy by ensuring that no individual deposit is larger than
$100,000. The second concern is that brokers often attempt to deposit
their funds in the riskiest institutions, which must pay the highest interest
rates.62 Increased use of brokered CDs therefore may actually increase the
cost to the FDIC of disposing of a troubled institution, because the insti-
tution will have had access to more insured deposits than it otherwise
would.6 Thus, because a partial nonpayment system would encourage
further brokering of CDs, such a system does not seem wise.
59. See Koehn & Santomero, supra note 17, at 1240.
60. Brokering of deposits occurs in several ways. Under straight brokering, a money broker, act-
ing on its own or at the request of an institution or institutions, solicits deposits from customers. The
customer may send deposits directly.to the bank at the request of the broker, or the broker itself may
transfer the customer's funds to the institution, having the deposit registered in its name as nominee or
agent for the customer. Under a CD participation agreement, the broker purchases a large denomina-
tion certificate of deposit and sells interests in the certificate to customers. These practices allow FDIC
insurance to apply to each individual customer to the maximum of $100,000. See Isaac, supra note 1,
at 214 n.48.
61. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1984, at F7, col. 1.
62. Horvitz has demonstrated that institutions with low net worth are more likely to behave in a
risky manner than are institutions with high net worth. See Horvitz, supra note 13, at 656-57. See
also 49 Fed. Reg. 13,003, 13,006 (1984).
63. See Isaac, supra note 1, at 214 n.48. In an attempt to alleviate the strain on the deposit
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In summary, partial nonpayment of uninsured deposits has several seri-
ous problems. Although such a strategy may impose an added measure of
market discipline on banks, the costs of this additional discipline could be
quite high.
C. Increased Disclosure
The third element of Isaac's proposal would require banks to disclose
more information to the public." Such additional disclosure is intended to
enable the market better to identify risky banks and to exercise greater
discipline over them." In fact, increased disclosure will not necessarily
heighten market discipline. Studies have found that the stock market al-
ready identifies large problem banks well before the FDIC does."" In-
creased disclosure therefore would be largely redundant for the sophisti-
cated large investor or financial analyst. Even for those banks whose stock
is not actively traded, publicly available data and existing statistical mod-
els are sufficient to identify most troubled banks one to two years before
failure, and sometimes up to six years in advance. 7
Furthermore, additional disclosure may not be cost justified. Theoreti-
cal analysis suggests that competition will enforce full disclosure if disclos-
ure is costless.68 Where disclosure is costly, however, full disclosure will
not be optimal. In such cases, the market will demand information up to
the point at which the marginal cost of securing additional information
equals the marginal benefit. Assuming that the market is already demand-
ing the optimal level of information, increased disclosure may lead to
suboptimal allocation of resources.0 9
insurance system caused by deposit brokering, the FDIC and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
issued rules in March 1984 limiting to $100,000 the insurance coverage provided to accounts placed
either by or through a broker. 49 Fed. Reg. 13,003 (1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 330, 561,
564). These regulations were declared illegal on June 20, 1984. See FAIC Securities, Inc. v. United
States, No. 84-0959 (D.D.C. June 20, 1984), reprinted in 49 Fed. Reg. 27,294 (1984). In response to
this decision, the FDIC recently issued an interim final rule requiring member banks with substantial
brokered deposits to report such holdings to the FDIC on a monthly basis. 49 Fed. Reg. 27,487
(1984) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 304.4).
64. Isaac, supra note 1, at 208-09.
65. Id. at 208.
66. Pettway, Potential Insolvency, Market Inefliciency and Bank Regulation of Large Commer-
cial Banks, 15 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 219 (1980). See also Sinkey, Identifying Large
Problem/Failed Banks: The Case of Franklin National Bank of New York, 12 J. FIN. & QUANTITA-
TIVE ANALYSIS 779 (1977); Pettway & Sinkey, Establishing On-Site Bank Examination Priorities: An
Early Warning System Using Accounting and Market Information, 35 J. FINANCE 137 (1980).
67. See Martin, Early Warning of Bank Failure: A Logit Regression Approach, 1 J. BANKING &
FIN. 249 (1977); Rose and Scott, Risk in Commercial Banking: Evidence from Postwar Failures, 45
S. ECON. J. 90 (1978).
68. See Barth and Cordes, Optimal Financial Disclosure with and Without SEC Regulation, 20
Q. REv. ECON. & BUS. 30 (1980). For a similar analysis with respect to corporate takeovers, see
Grossman & Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FINANCE 323 (1980).
69. Of course, it is important to recognize that market failures may prevent the attainment of this
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Even if increased disclosure were cost-effective and non-redundant, it
would not increase market discipline unless implemented in conjunction
with a partial nonpayment policy. If all depositors perceived themselves to
be fully protected, they would have little incentive, apart from liquidity
considerations, either to collect information regarding the financial pros-
pects of a given bank or to react to such information. On the other hand,
if depositors perceived themselves to be less than fully insured, an unstable
condition might result in which bank runs could be precipitated even by
false information.
IV. Alternatives to Deposit Insurance Reform
The potentially destabilizing effects of the FDIC's proposed reforms
suggest the prudence of considering other workable alternatives. Three
possibilities merit further attention: strengthening the bank examination
and supervision process, increasing the frequency of payouts in certain
situations, and imposing additional market discipline through bondholders
and long-term depositors.
A. Enhanced Bank Examination and Supervision
The most promising alternative to the FDIC's proposed reforms is to
strengthen the bank supervision and examination process through the im-
position of more stringent capital requirements and the use of supplemen-
tary early warning models.70 Studies show that such models are very ef-
fective in detecting banks with potential liquidity problems.7' By using
such models, the FDIC can direct its scarce resources to those institutions
which most need attention. Spotting problem banks at an early stage is
possibly the most important step the FDIC can take to protect the integ-
rity of the deposit insurance system.
These objectives should also be pursued through more stringent capital
requirements. As mentioned above, increasing capital requirements will
optimal equilibrium.
70. Early warning models use both accounting data, such as currently reported balance sheet and
income sheet data, and general market data to project the future financial soundness of a bank.
71. Several studies have shown the effectiveness of using early warning models based upon cur-
rently reported balance sheet and income sheet data. See Korobow, Stuhr, and Martin, A Nationwide
Test of Early Warning Research in Banking, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. Q. REV., Autumn 1977, at
37; Martin, supra note 67; Sinkey, A Multivariate Statistical Analysis of the Characteristics of Prob-
lem Banks, 30 J. FINANCE 21 (1975). Other recent studies have demonstrated that market value data
may be useful in supplementing the accounting data already available. See Pettway & Sinkey, supra
note 66; Pettway, supra note 66; Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insurance
and Loan Guarantees: An Application of Modern Option Pricing Theory, I J. BANKING & FIN. 3(1977); Sharpe, Bank Capital Adequacy, Deposit Insurance and Security Values, 13 J. FIN. & QUAN-
TITATIVE ANALYSIS 701 (1978).
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lengthen the interval between the time a bank becomes unprofitable and
the time it becomes insolvent. A longer interval, combined with earlier
detection, will further increase the FDIC's ability to spot problems before
large losses occur. Obviously, early detection of problem banks must be
combined with prompt and decisive action by the supervisory agencies
once a problem has been identified.
B. Increased Use of Deposit Payouts
A second alternative to the FDIC's proposals, which could be applied
only where the risk of systemic complications is low, would be for the
FDIC to increase its use of the deposit payout mechanism. Under the
current system, when a bank is declared insolvent, the FDIC may either
close the bank and pay off depositors (as in the Penn Square case) or
engineer a merger or consolidation with another bank, often referred to as
a purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction." The FDIC has consider-
able discretion in determining which method to use in dealing with an
insolvent institution,"3 but it usually chooses the P&A transaction. Since
1960, the FDIC has used the P&A transaction to deal with the majority
of failed commercial banks, including every failed bank with assets ex-
ceeding $100 million except Penn Square."'
The P&A transaction benefits the FDIC because the agency can re-
cover a premium for the "going concern" value of the bank. 5 Such a
transaction also benefits the uninsured depositor by effectively insuring his
or her deposits." As long as the market perceives that the FDIC will use
P&A transactions in large bank failures, such banks can acquire deposits
on more favorable terms than can small banks. If the FDIC chose the
deposit payout alternative more frequently, heightened market discipline
of bank risk-taking could be achieved within the confines of the present
system.
Of course, deposit payouts should only be used when systemic risk is
low.7 Stability of the financial sector has always been the FDIC's most
important goal and should not be compromised in an effort to exert
greater market discipline. The need to maintain stability limits the fre-
quency with which regulators should resort to the payout alternative.
72. Isaac, supra note 1, at 202-03.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 202, 205.
75. Id. at 203.
76. Id.
77. The FDIC treated the Continental Illinois problem differently from Penn Square because of
the much larger size of the Illinois bank. The collapse of Continental Illinois could have led to a run
on other major U.S. banks and caused severe shocks to worldwide financial stability. See Thurow,
supra note 31, at 73.
Vol. 2: 145, 1984
Deposit Insurance
When the risks of destabilizing effects are low, however, an occasional
deposit payout may be a reasonable way to increase market discipline.
C. Increased Market Discipline Via Equity and Debt Holders
A third alternative to deposit insurance reform is to create incentives for
shareholders and bondholders to exert greater market discipline over
banks."8 Shareholders and subordinated debtholders (or bondholders) are
in many respects better situated to discipline banks than are short-term
depositors. Subordinated debtholders cannot withdraw their funds at face
value from a weak bank on short notice. Shareholders, of course, cannot
withdraw their investments from the bank itself; they can liquidate their
investments only in the stock market (if the bank's stock is publicly
traded) or by negotiating a private sale. In either case, the value of the
stock depends on the bank's prospects at the time of sale. Hence, these
parties have strong incentives to investigate a bank's long-term prospects
before making their initial investments.71
In order for shareholders and subordinated debtholders to exert greater
market discipline, capital adequacy standards must be revised. The FDIC
should require banks to maintain a higher protective cushion of equity
and subordinated debt as a percentage of assets. Increasing the effective
"coinsurance" provided by shareholders and subordinated debtholders will
benefit both bank depositors and the FDIC by reducing the possibility of
deposit losses from a bank failure.
Despite the possible benefits of increased coinsurance, however, a num-
ber of problems would hamper the implementation of such a proposal and
make it unacceptable as a short-term solution. First, regulators must re-
solve the difficult issues of what should qualify as a subordinated note,
when convertibility should be allowed, and what the appropriate maturi-
ties should be. Second, regulators must develop safeguards to ensure that
large blocks of debt do not mature at once. Third, regulators must deter-
mine what sort of debt-equity standard to impose, giving adequate consid-
eration to the market's ability to supply the required level of capital. Fi-
nally, regulators should consider the costs to society of bank
overcapitalization, particularly if capital must be channeled from other,
more profitable types of investments."0
More seriously, placing debt and equity holders as well as long-term
78. Isaac has briefly discussed this possibility. See Isaac, supra note 1, at 212-13.
79. Bondholders, moreover, because they receive a contractually fixed return, receive no benefit
from a bank's assumption of increased risk. This, of course, is not necessarily true of shareholders.
80. See Santomero and Watson, Determining an Optimal Capital Standard for the Banking In-
dustry, 32 J. FINANCE 1267, 1272-77 (1977).
See Federal Reserve Bank Board, Statistical Release G-9 (June 29, 1983).
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depositors at greater risk might discourage these parties from placing their
funds in financial institutions. The large, sophisticated investor faces
many competing alternatives and simply may choose not to place deposits
in banks. For example, large, negotiable CDs with maturities in excess of
one year currently comprise only ten percent of the total number of large
negotiable CDs.8 ' Such long-term deposits might diminish further if they
were not insured, severely hindering the ability of financial institutions to
make fixed-rate term loans.
In summary, at least two promising responses to deregulation currently
exist: improvements in the bank examination and supervision process and
the more frequent use of deposit payouts in situations involving low sys-
temic risk. These changes can be incorporated into the present system
without great difficulty and without creating serious destabilizing effects.
The third alternative, inducing subordinated debtholders or shareholders
to exert greater market discipline, is attractive in many respects, but the
difficulties which might accompany its implementation require further
study before it can be considered a serious alternative.
Conclusion
The three reforms of the current deposit insurance system which Isaac
has proposed-risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums, partial nonpay-
ment of uninsured deposits, and increased disclosure-would seriously un-
dermine the stability of financial markets if implemented at the present
time. Moreover, such reform may be unnecessary. Relaxation of current
product line limitations, geographic restrictions, and interest rate ceilings
can proceed smoothly as long as banks are required to maintain sufficient
levels of capital and are adequately supervised.
If greater market discipline of banks is desirable, however, some
changes may be necessary. A survey of the possible alternatives to the
Isaac proposals indicates that the occasional use of deposit payouts, rather
than purchase and assumption transactions, may be desirable when sys-
temic risk is low. Another alternative, inducing shareholders and subordi-
nated debtholders to exert greater market discipline, deserves further con-
sideration. In short, deposit insurance reform raises complicated issues;
hence, the FDIC's proposals may work better on paper than in practice.
81. See Federal Reserve Bank Board, Statistical Release G-9 (June 29, 1983).
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